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I
n Cambodia, land and natural resources occupy a central place in the production systems of 
peasants who represent about 80 percent of the country’s population. The development and 
governance of socio-ecological systems trigger considerable economic, social and environmental 
issues that need to be addressed urgently given the profound nature of the transformations at 
play in these systems across Cambodia.
Against the background of Cambodian peasant conceptions of, and approaches towards, land tenure 
security, we present the historical evolution of, and current challenges presented by, various land 
reforms that have attempted to formalize the land property rights system in the Kingdom. We sug-
gest that current land tenure regimes in Cambodia are highly fragmented between lowland central 
plains and peripheral uplands, which has yielded problematic results. We discuss the attempts by 
the government to address the ensuing contradictions. 
THE LAND AND PEOPLE OF CAMBODIA AT A GLANCE 
The Kingdom of Cambodia is located in the southern portion of the Indochina peninsula in Southeast 
Asia. Its 181,035 square kilometres are bordered by Thailand to the Northwest, Laos to the North-
east, and Vietnam to the East. On the fourth and open side, Cambodia faces the Gulf of Thailand.
Topographically, the country resembles a shallow volcano. Forming the rim, two ranges of moun-
tain—Cardamom and Elephant—follow the Thai border. In the Northeast, the land rises to a plateau 
up to the borders with Laos and Vietnam. These mountains and plateau are mostly forested. Inside 
the rim is a lowland area connecting the Tonle Sap Great Lake plain with the Mekong alluvial plain. 
Both the Tonle Sap and Mekong Rivers cross streams in Phnom Penh, the capital city.
According to the 2008 demographic census the Cambodian population ﬁ gure at the time was 
13.395.682 of whom 48.6 percent were male (National Institute of Statistics 2009). Between 1998 
and 2008 the annual growth rate of the population was 1.54 percent, which was higher than that 
of other countries in Southeast Asia. Historically, the Cambodian population has been concentrated 
in lowland areas around the Tonle Sap Great Lake and the Mekong River. These regions have the 
highest population ﬁ gures and are the most densely populated regions in the country (Map 1). The 
urbanization, measured as a percentage of the population living in urban areas1 to the total popula-
tion, has increased from 18.3 in 1998 to 19.5 in 2008 (National Institute of Statistics 2012). This 
means that the vast majority of the population remain rural.
The overwhelming majority of the population are of Khmer ethnicity (96.3 percent). The most im-
portant ethnic minorities are Vietnamese (1.5 percent of the population) and Cham (0.5 percent). 
The proportion of indigenous people is generally reckoned to range from 1 to 1.7 percent of the 
population as a whole and they mostly live in the Northeast plateau area where they practise swid-
den agriculture.
Cambodia remains one of Asia’s poorest countries but has witnessed dynamic and sustained growth 
over the past two decades. Amidst a challenging global economic environment, the annual gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth rate between 2005 and 2013 was 7.6 percent2. Agriculture is a 
central pillar of the economy representing 35.6 percent of the GDP structure in 20123 and providing 
the main employment for 51 percent of the national labour force4. The other important sectors are 
the garment industry (16 percent of GDP) and services (mainly construction and tourism) accounting 
for 40.1 percent of GDP in 2012.
1. Urban areas are designated according to criteria set by the National Institute of Statistics and have the following characteristics: (i) popula-
tion density exceeding 200 per km2, (ii) percentage of male employment in agriculture below 50 percent and (iii) total population of each 
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The demographic increase and, in particular, the effects of the post-war baby boom, have resulted 
in an annual labour force increase estimated at 220,000 to 300,000 people (Chan 2009; Lundström 
and Ronnas 2006). Agriculture has reached a limit in its capacity to absorb newcomers in the job 
market, so the creation of viable and productive jobs in the farm and non-farm sector is key. But 
this is further challenged by the narrow development options in the secondary and tertiary sectors 
that rely mostly on garment factories, tourism and construction (Acharya et al. 2003; Jalilian 2008).
Although poverty in Cambodia has fallen sharply, the poverty rate in 2012 was still considerable, at 
18.6 percent, with almost 3 million poor people and more than 8.1 million who are in the “near-
poor” bracket. About 90 percent of these poor and near-poor people live in the countryside. The 
actual gap between the rich and the poor has increased in absolute terms, and the majority of 
households that have escaped poverty have done so by only a small margin—they remain highly 
vulnerable to falling back into poverty (World Bank 2013).
In a context of rampant rural poverty, constrained agrarian transition and low public investment in 
agriculture, the pressure on agriculture and on the peasants is immense. The sector needs to address 
the increase in the rural population, the food consumption diversiﬁ cation of the urban population—
which has grown proportionally faster—and to generate surplus rice for export.
Agricultural production is predominantly carried out by household-scale exploitation. As of 2013, 
85 percent of the total number of households were engaged in some form of agricultural-related 
activities, and 72 percent of the total number of households in Cambodia managed a so-called agri-
cultural holding5, covering a total land area size of 3.1 million hectares. The average agricultural land 
size per farming household is 1.6 ha (National Institute of Statistics 2014). Among households with 
5. An economic unit under single management comprising at least two large livestock animals and/or at least three small livestock animals 
and/or at least 25 poultry of any kind and/or land with a size of at least 300 square meters, used wholly or partly for agricultural production 
purposes regardless of title, legal form or size.
MAP 1: Population density in Cambodia in 2008
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agricultural holdings, 73 percent are engaged in agriculture mainly to meet their personal consump-
tion needs. The percentage of agricultural landless households was 29 in 2011 (Phann et al. 2015).
Two main types of cropping systems can be identiﬁ ed in Cambodia: the inundated rice-based, 
and chamcar-based (non-rice) systems (Map 2). Inundated rice-based systems are adapted to the 
speciﬁ c agro-ecological conditions of the lowland plain and are marked by the seasonal ﬂ ood (and 
recession) of ﬂ ood water coming from the Mekong River. The rain-fed rice systems cover the larg-
est cropping area in Cambodia and have been the target of many investment initiatives to develop 
irrigation infrastructure. The receding rice varieties are cultivated in the dry season when the ﬂ ood 
water recedes. The third main rice system exists in the vast deep-water rice zone bordering the Tonle 
Sap ﬂ oodplain (Pillot 2007). 
The second main type of cropping system groups all non-inundated rice crops under the theme 
chamcar. It encompasses the forms of intensive multi-cropping conducted along the main river 
banks, the swidden agriculture prevalent in the Northeast plateau, and the ever-expanding upland 
annual or perennial crop systems. 
MAP 2: Distribution of main cropping systems in Cambodia
A GENEALOGY OF LAND TENURE REGIMES
The historical turbulence that accompanied the rise and fall of political regimes severely affected 
the development of land tenure regimes in Cambodia. To address those, we identify and discuss key 
land tenure institutions that have been a traditional norm for rural communities in the country, and 
that are still visible today. These institutions have remained consistent throughout history and remain 
pivotal in contemporary rural Cambodia. We suggest that these institutions are the building blocks 
of an endogenous form of territorial management in Cambodian rural communities.
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The way Khmer peasants have traditionally perceived
and appropriated land
According to traditional Khmer rural codes, the king is the owner of land and water (Macha Teuk Dey) 
in the country and its farmers are users. The right to land access and use could be claimed by clearing, 
settling on the land and actually cultivating it. This practice is commonly known as appropriation “by 
the plough”. As long as it does not infringe on the rights of others in the community, the cultivation 
of a piece of land for subsistence farming provides farmers with individual possession rights (Olivier 
1954). If a farmer stops cultivating his plot of land for three consecutive years, he loses his de facto 
possession rights to the plot which then becomes available for somebody else. In a context in which 
demographic pressure on land was low and the country was endowed with a large land “reserve”, 
this regime of “by the plough” land appropriation allowed farmers an important freedom of move-
ment over the territory (Greve 1993). However, in order to place rice production and labour under 
the effective control of the state, a royal tax of 10 percent was levied on rice production (Chandler 
1998). The chovay srok—provincial or district governors—were authorized to collect taxes from their 
srok (province/district), from which they could also mobilize labour for warfare or public works. Ac-
cess to manpower and rice meant that in practice the chovay srok had considerable power in the 
Kingdom (Chandler 1998; Rungswasdisab 1995).
Rice production has been the core activity in Cambodian peasant production systems but it is 
integrated into a larger portfolio of activities, most notably the collection and management of 
natural resources on “commons”, which individual farmers co-manage with others. The Tonle Sap 
ﬂ oodplain is a rich ﬁ sheries domain but is characterized by continually changing land use patterns 
ranging from rice cultivation, grasslands used for grazing cattle, and shrub land where a variety of 
non-timber forest products are harvested. This diversity of land use is maintained through a variety 
of practices with the objective of ensuring a ﬂ exible and diverse supply of crucial natural products 
for local livelihoods while at the same time maintaining agro-ecosystem fertility (Diepart 2007; 
Roberts 2011). In riparian villages forests have a central role in providing a high diversity of timber 
and non-timber products. 
The management of common-pool resources by the peasantry is exempliﬁ ed in diversiﬁ cation pat-
terns and risk coping mechanisms that enable them to make sustainable use of limited resources 
and to reduce the risk to their livelihoods that is associated with their reliance on a limited number 
of products. 
In Khmer rural communities the central decision-making institution in land and natural resources is 
the household and traditionally this is not dictated to by a superior community-based organisation. 
The local economy results primarily from strategic decisions made by households who try to maxi-
mize their interests. It is the coordination of those household-level decision-making processes that 
determines the management of the commons. Conceiving land management as the social relations 
of production negotiated between households allows the community to adapt with great ﬂ exibility 
to a series of parameters that evolve across different temporal and spatial scales with agrarian/
household production systems. These include demographic differentiation, availability and seasonal 
variation of resources, access to markets and processing. The maintenance of a mosaic of land use 
suggests an explicit recognition of the heterogeneity of household strategies. Given the importance 
of commons for the subsistence of peasantries, the diversiﬁ cation of land occupation can be seen 
as a collective strategy to secure the means of subsistence for entire communities.
Decisions relating to land and resource management are socially negotiated between households and 
are inﬂ uenced by two important institutions or norms that are constitutive elements of the historical 
governance in Cambodian peasant communities. First, social relations are traditionally based on a 
form of trust linked to the moral obligations between a patron and a client. These norms constitute 
key social bonds in rural communities (Ledgerwood and Vijghen 2002). Patronage consists of a con-
sistent hierarchical social structure characterized by a ﬂ exible set of dyadic relationships extending 
down from the king and his administration to the village. Such arrangements that form patron-client 
relationships have been a continuous and central element of the Khmer social fabric throughout 
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history and remain a key social organizing factor in contemporary Cambodia. Patronage is exercised 
and produced in speciﬁ c ﬁ elds of power including political-administrative (dominated by local au-
thorities). In the land sector, the social consensus that recognizes occupation of land was formed 
under the authority of the village or commune chief. Other patronage ﬁ elds comprise the economic 
networks structured around those who control the provision of agricultural inputs, the commerciali-
zation of outputs and the access to credit. The intervention of development agencies should also be 
considered as a new sphere of patronage in Cambodian villages (Ledgerwood and Vijghen 2002). In 
reality, these patronage networks are all entangled, and the inter-dependence of households within 
these multi-faceted patronage networks is the norm across the Cambodian countryside. Patrons are 
dominant, and, as such, from a peasant perspective, they direct activity, thereby providing certain 
forms of social and physical security. Nevertheless, these traditional patronage networks are be-
ing challenged and transformed under the pressure of political power and the liberalization of the 
economy. This is resulting in fragile links and weak trust between the communities and the public 
institutions that often collude with private investors. 
Another important feature of collective action (and conﬂ ict resolution) are the associations created 
and structured around the pagoda. These associations are usually transitory and are meant only 
to address a speciﬁ c need or problem in the community across a wide range of social endeavours 
(education, ceremonies, public work, access to credit, and so on). Even if these associations are not 
directly involved in land and natural resource management, they constitute social arenas or platforms 
where community dialogue is instituted. These social networks develop slowly and decisions are 
taken by consensus. Nevertheless, they have the ability, resources and competence to gather the 
stakeholders and nurture dialogue for collective action (Aschmoneit 1995; 1998; Pellini 2007). These 
associations are fragile because they are easily inﬂ uenced by politics or economics but they can be 
constructive in mediation and conﬂ ict management. They deﬁ nitively represent a form of peasant 
historic governance that ensures collective security (Diepart 2010).
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Modernization of the land tenure regime during the French
protectorate (1863-1953)
The notion of private land ownership and the modernization of communal land property rights 
were introduced under French colonial administration in a move to stimulate rice production, secure 
land of interest to the French and allow urban investment. The French introduced land titles and 
a department of cadastre to oversee both technical instruments and administrative procedures in 
land registration.
The modernization of land property rights consists of a change from a possession right (paukeas) to 
an ownership right (kamaset). The difference is subtle but signiﬁ cant. Possession suggests that the 
right to use the land is attached to certain conditions including continuous presence, and utilization 
of the land tenure is embedded locally through the recognition by social consensus formed under 
the authority of the village and commune chiefs. In contrast, ownership rights are deﬁ nitive and 
inalienable. The transformation of possession to ownership rights rests on the premise that owner-
ship rights give more security and incentives to farmers and investors to use the land more efﬁ ciently, 
and it marks the complete commodiﬁ cation of land: that is, its alienation from the social fabric in 
which it is embedded (Polanyi 1957).
Land registration and titling implemented by the French administration consisted of two consecutive 
steps that followed two distinct procedures and involved two categories of actors:
1. the registration of land as ﬁ xed asset (equivalent to a possession (paukeas) certiﬁ cate) was based 
on peaceful and at least a ﬁ ve-year occupation of a plot of land overseen by the commune chief 
(Me Khum) who acted as the certifying ofﬁ cer;
2. on that basis, the land title and transfer of the ownership right could be delivered, but this pro-
cedure required a written property transfer and registration from the cadastral ofﬁ ce.
The difference between possession and ownership was not clear because farmers usually had full 
land tenure security by local recognition of the possession. In addition, the delivery of title needed 
to be conducted by a more distant administration which they did not necessarily trust.
Thion (1993) explains that the establishment of the new land rights institutions in Cambodia did not 
proceed smoothly but was accompanied by resistance on the part of both the local authorities and the 
Cambodian peasants because land titles meant the imposition of tax, which they were not willing to pay. 
This largely explains why the delivery of possession certiﬁ cation (in the form of ﬁ xed asset certiﬁ cates) 
covered a large area of the country (90 percent) whereas only a small proportion (10 percent) of the 
land was titled. Nevertheless, appropriation “by the plough” remained the norm across the country.
The new tax system obliged the peasants to pay a certain percentage of their production in cash, 
and thus compelled them to engage in the market economy by selling part of their production. This 
cash economy created usury credit systems and resulted in widespread indebtedness among peasants 
(Thion 1993). Combined with the development of land markets, indebtedness led to land dispos-
session by mortgage or sale and the emergence of landlessness, the land lease and the creation of 
agricultural wage labour (Kiernan and Boua 1982).
In 1899, the French army provided Cambodia with a rudimentary forest administration, placed under 
the forest service of Cochinchina. To sustain colonial forest rents, the French administration initiated 
a system of forest reserves to allow for forest regeneration. Starting in 1902, logging activities were 
regulated within these state enclosures according to licences signed between French companies and 
the forest administration, the so-called “exclusive logging privilege”. This was a clear attempt to sub-
stitute small-scale indigenous forest use with large-scale entrepreneurial exploitation (Thomas 1999) 
and represents the beginning of the concession system in Cambodia. As part of this, Cambodians 
were denied access to these forests (Gouvernement Général d’Indochine 1910) which also meant a 
drastic reduction in grazing herds. 
Land concessions for plantation agriculture were an important tool of French colonization in Indo-
china, particularly in southern Vietnam but also in Cambodia. The ﬁ rst rubber plantation in Cam-
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bodia, the Chup Plantation, was established by the French in 1921 and was at one time the largest 
rubber plantation in the world (Slocomb 2007). By the 1930s, less than a decade after land was ﬁ rst 
granted to French investors, rubber was the third largest export from Cambodia. Commentators 
writing during this period made claim that the large rubber plantations “marked the beginning of 
capitalist colonisation in Indochina” (Virginia Thompson 1937 cited in Slocomb 2007).
The establishment of forest reserves and rubber plantations, and the expansion of large land en-
closures by urban investors who secured their land through the cadastral system established by the 
French, had considerably reduced the possibility of land expansion. In fact, land access and land 
concentration associated with agrarian class formation were already serious issues in Cambodia in 
the early twentieth century. These agrarian dynamics were central to the analyses made by future 
Khmer Rouge leaders in their doctoral dissertations (Hou 1955; Hu 1965; Khieu 1959).
Post-independence and the persistence of French rules (1953-1975) 
King Norodom Sihanouk, the father of independence in 1953, abdicated in 1955 to take the post of 
prime minister of the Kingdom. His politics did not challenge land and forest tenure arrangements 
previously established by the French. Concessions were nationalized but remained the principal forest 
management instrument, and the titling of settlement and agricultural land was pursued. Land mar-
kets were still promoted and investment in the agricultural sector by urban dwellers was encouraged. 
The Sihanouk administration could not reduce the growing inequalities initiated in the early part of 
the century. In the 1960s, the indebtedness of peasants and their dependency on usurers became 
the norm (Kiernan 2004). This period was also characterized by the continuation of land inequality 
in Cambodia. In reality, the socio-economic conditions of peasants at the end of the 1960s were 
not essentially different from those that had prevailed in the 1920s and 1930s (Prud’homme 1969).
So (2009) notes that land continued to be claimed in three ways: ownership title; ﬁ xed asset registra-
tion; and simply by occupation. While the main growing areas were either registered under ownership 
or through ﬁ xed asset registration, land continued to be cleared, utilized, and claimed through the 
customary arrangements that had existed prior to the introduction of the private property system. 
The continuation of customary land clearing and ownership through occupation, coupled with a 
modern system of property rights, caused conﬂ icts when the government failed to protect those 
vulnerable groups who did not integrate into the modern property system. 
A crucial stimulus of the peasants’ revolt, which took place in 1967 in Samlaut (which lies in the north 
of the Cardamom Mountains), was land grabs. Powerful government and military ofﬁ cials manipulated 
the legal system and sought to invalidate undocumented ownership by issuing to themselves titles 
to the land that had been cleared by local villagers. The revolt was quelled through repression. Many 
people who were involved in the revolt took refuge in the forests where a small group of communist 
insurgents was hiding (Kiernan 1982; Thion 1993). Among them was the Khmer Rouge (KR), a group 
of communist revolutionaries who were piloting collectivized farming in the areas under their control.
1970, the Khmer Republic was declared after King Sihanouk was dethroned by a military coup d’Etat 
fomented by General Lon Nol with support from the US. Sihanouk and the royal family were exiled 
and the entire royal entourage was dismissed. Private property rights as such continued to be recog-
nized under the Khmer Republic (Greve 1993). This period of Cambodian history became plagued 
with corruption and tensions between the peasantry and the ruling authority were exacerbated, thus 
paving the way to dominance by the Khmer Rouge.
The Democratic Kampuchea experience and the imposition
of collectivization (1975-1979)
The modernization project of Democratic Kampuchea (DK) was based on the construction of a nation-
state, and its implementation between 1975 and 1979 was radical. The national priority was the 
development of the rice sector. The Angkar—the ruling body of the Khmer Rouge—abolished the 
right of individuals to possess land, nationalized the entire agricultural domain and collectivized all 
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means of production. Labour was organized within collective production groups to which individuals 
were conscripted. The production surplus was exported to China against goods and weapons. The 
urban population living in the kampong (urban centre) were forced out to the countryside. Forest 
concessions were cancelled and access to forests was forbidden for the population who were now 
engaged in collective farming. Cadastral administration and land titling procedures were brought 
to a complete stop. These new forms of appropriation of space and the underlying social relations 
radically transformed rural territories and, indeed, the entire society: the DK regime is notorious for 
committing human atrocities including the extermination of 1 to 2 million people
Krom Samaki and the collectivization of the peasants (1979-1989)
The Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia in late 1978 led to the collapse of DK rule in Cambodia 
except in the Northwest where it simply marked the beginning of their resistance activity. The new 
government of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) was formed from early members of the 
Khmer Rouge who had escaped to Vietnam to avoid the purges of Pol Pot and had come back to 
Cambodia with the support of the Vietnamese and Soviet governments. A second group of Cambo-
dians who formed the RPK comprised Indochinese war veteran who had ﬂ ed to Vietnam after the 
Geneva accords in 1954 (Frings 1997).
The ﬁ rst months of 1979 witnessed chaos across the country. People who were displaced during 
the DK period migrated throughout the country in search of land, family and peace of soul after so 
much brutality and upheaval. These movements are poorly understood but demographer Jacque-
line Desbarat (1995) argues that it is plausible that a large majority of people were re-integrated 
within the villages they had occupied before 1975. In the absence of any legal framework, de facto 
re-appropriation of animals and agricultural equipment that people owned before 1975 took place 
(Frings 1997). 
Starting in May 1979, when the socio-political situation stabilized, a new unit of agricultural pro-
duction, the Krom Samaki (namely Solidarity Group), was declared and recognized by the RPK 
government as the main unit of rural development (Frings 1997). A Krom Samaki comprised a small 
group of 10-15 families who used the land, agricultural equipment and draught animals collectively. 
Agricultural land was the property of the state but was distributed to each family within the group 
according to the number of active labourers. General rules of distribution were dictated by the 
central party but implemented locally by the group chief. In practice this meant that, whereas the 
principles were supposed to be unequivocal, the interpretation of the rules was contingent on the 
discretion of the local authorities (both the Krom Samaki ofﬁ cials and the village chiefs), and this 
gave rise to a number of divergences that contributed to initiating land differentiation beginning as 
early as the1980s. 
During the war, some agricultural land was abandoned and colonized by a secondary shrub vegeta-
tion regrowth. There were no speciﬁ c rules to govern the distribution of this land (Frings 1993), so 
access to it was dependent on either the labour capacity and willingness of certain families to expand 
their agricultural landholdings, or on the privileged relationships certain families had with the Krom 
Samaki ofﬁ cials or village chief.
The agricultural activities were meant to be conducted collectively with equipment and draught 
animals that were either collectively or privately owned but collectively shared with the group. The 
group chief was in charge of recording the amount of labour everyone spent on production, and 
redistributed the harvest according to this number. In areas with low production, a directive stipu-
lated that households needed to show solidarity and distribute the harvest equally according to 
consumption needs. 
In a move to motivate the peasants, the theoretical model of Krom Samaki was reformed some 
years after it was ﬁ rst put in place. Some land was given as usufruct (the right to enjoy the land 
without changing it) to families and, from 1982, authorities recognized the differentiation of the 
Krom Samaki model and the existence within it of three levels with differential degrees of col-
lectivization. 
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Under these differentiation forces and in the absence of a strong state to counter-balance them, Krom 
Samaki was dismantled de facto in the countryside in the early to mid-eighties. The rule, which was 
usually only a recognition of the actual de-collectivization on the ground, was that land previously 
allocated to each family within each Krom Samaki was redistributed to them. The draught animals 
and equipment that were previously appropriated remained with the same families and the collec-
tive equipment was redistributed to families according to the number of people or active members 
each family had. But because animals and equipment are not divisible, they were usually distributed 
to families with higher numbers of active labourers. As a consequence, the difference in land/labour 
ratios that prevailed during Krom Samaki was almost unchanged after the redistribution.
There is a large consensus amongst scholars of that period to portray the Krom Samaki as a complete 
failure (Frings 1993; So 2009). This verdict was based on the fact that the system created conﬂ ict 
between people who were hard-working and their lazier counterparts, that there was a lack of 
human resources to oversee and encourage collectivization, and that the people involved feared a 
political backlash from imposing strong penalties for non-compliance with collectivization directives. 
However, after the trauma of DK, there is little doubt that, at the time, people were not willing to 
embark on a new collectivization of agriculture. The social contract between the farmers and the 
state was unsustainable as the people’s efforts in respect of national reconstruction by far outweighed 
the concrete support they received from the state (in forms such as seeds, fertilizers, tractor fuel and 
other necessities for agricultural development). And the forces of differentiation in the Cambodian 
countryside were so strong that a communist government, who had to face external and internal 
contests and who lacked competent cadres, could not actually address them.
However the contribution of Krom Samaki was far from insigniﬁ cant. In a post-war context of 
generalized starvation, ruined agricultural infrastructure, uncontrolled migration movements and 
international isolation, the system allowed a quick recovery of agricultural production in regions 
heavily destroyed by the war. Even if they were instruments of central party politics, the management 
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of Krom Samaki were quite decentralized in their everyday routine work. This gave a great deal of 
ﬂ exibility to identify and adjust land tenure regimes that were socially acceptable and economically 
sound. This is undoubtedly an important dimension of land security. Krom Samaki were managed 
mostly by peasant-like authorities, they reﬂ ected a strong resilience on the part of peasant house-
holds and institutions, and they emphasized the superiority of family farming over collective modes 
of agricultural production.
Liberalization and unequal access to land (1989-2001)
At the end of the 1980s, collectivization was ofﬁ cially abandoned. Cambodia then embarked on a se-
ries of reforms relating to private property rights that laid the foundation for the current land reforms. 
In 1989, a number of new legal provisions relevant to land were included in the constitution (Jen-
nar 1995). Land remained the property of the state and no-one could claim rights to land acquired 
before 1979. All Cambodians now had the right to occupy, use and sell the land allocated to them 
by the state. Three types of land were deﬁ ned: settlements (loumneuvthan); agricultural (kasekam); 
and concession (sambathian, covering more than 5 ha, for agro-industrial development). At this 
stage, there was still a distinction between possession rights to agricultural and concession land, 
and ownership of residential land.
In order to synthesize all these new legal provisions, a Land Law was passed in 1992. This law con-
ﬁ rmed that all land belonged to the state and that all Cambodians had possession rights (access, use, 
claim, transmission and exclusion). But the rest of the law was confusing. While it strictly forbade the 
private ownership of agricultural land, at the same time it established the conditions for someone 
with a possession certiﬁ cate to become the actual owner of the land. Van Acker argues that this 
law failed to synthesize the three main land tenure regimes inherited from history: the appropriation 
“by the plough”; state; and private ownership (jurisdiction) promoted by the French and the socialist 
ideology that prevailed in the 1970s to 1980s (Van Acker 1999). 
In 1989, a procedure for so-called ‘sporadic land registration’ was put in place to register the agri-
cultural land. This sporadic process involved a number of steps before land titles could be issued, a 
procedure that So (2009) summarizes into two main stages. First, farming families who had received 
land plots for cultivation were required to submit applications for land possession rights to the ca-
dastral ofﬁ ce. Importantly, the application required veriﬁ cation by both the village and commune 
authorities before being submitted to the district cadastral authority. Second, cadastral ofﬁ cials actu-
ally visited the plots to conduct technical surveys and demarcations, after which the application was 
forwarded for approval from different relevant authorities. This procedure, in two steps, resembles 
the one designed and implemented 70 years earlier under the French rule.
Again, the transition to private ownership remained incomplete. From the 4.2 million applications 
for land titles received by the cadastral administration, only 448,678 (10 percent) could actually be 
issued (Van Acker 1999). The complexity of the procedure and the clear lack of resources allocated 
by the state to endorse the implementation partially explain this backlog. But corruption associated 
with the procedure also excluded people from successfully completing the process. At each and 
every step in the procedure an extra payment was required by the under-paid staff in charge of the 
registration. This real cost was obviously prohibitive for an ordinary peasant, who usually decided to 
abandon the procedure when asked to pay the extra. Those who could afford registration were the 
well-connected people and the urban investors who became important actors in the land markets 
of the 1990s. The consequence of this procedure was, again, the fragmentation of the land tenure 
regime between possession and property rights, socially recognized and approved locally by the Me 
Khum (the commune chief), and inalienable private ownership acquired through cadastral procedure. 
The distinction is very important though as an ownership title can invalidate a possession certiﬁ cate in 
the case of a conﬂ ict that goes to court (East-West Management Institute 2003). And in the context 
of emerging land markets and rising land value this distinction is very signiﬁ cant.
Access to agricultural land in the 1990s is characterized by a rising inequality in terms of agricultural 
landholding size, taking place through the related processes of landlessness and land concentration. 
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The Landlessness and Development Investigation Tool survey (LADIT), conducted by the Oxfam Cam-
bodian Land Study Project from 1999-2000, presents the most convincing approach to examine and 
understand landlessness and land concentration. Based on recall survey methods, LADIT suggests 
that the proportion of people who were landless in 1960 was 4.01 percent, rising to an estimated 
15 percent in 2001 (Biddulph 2000). Landlessness and land concentration are closely related to the 
emergence and rapid development of an active land market legitimized by the new economic reform 
agenda, namely economic liberalization and privatization. Land sales are usually driven by the socio-
economic vulnerability of the household (distress sales). On the demand side, land purchases are 
triggered by two types of actors: the successful farmers who accumulate capital in the agricultural 
and non-agricultural sectors and buy additional land from their fellow peasants, and the emerging 
urban investors (Diepart 2010). In the absence of protective mechanisms that would prevent peasants 
from falling into over-indebtedness, the land market of the 1990s led to market-based dispossession 
and increasing landlessness in rural Cambodia.
The 1992 Land Law is sometimes portrayed as a “get rich quick” manual for the upwardly mobile 
(Shaun 1999). In the prevailing post-war socio-economic context, the 1992 Land Law is highly prob-
lematic due to the convergence of several factors. The ability to access land through markets and 
the increasing value of land, combined with the misuse of power, the incomplete and biased land 
titling services, and the absence of functioning land management institutions, set the stage for illicit 
land acquisition and the intensiﬁ cation of land conﬂ icts (Cooper 2002; Guillou 2006). 
The development of a concession economy in the 1990s
In the 1990s, the concession system was reintroduced with strong support from international or-
ganizations, particularly the World Bank, and became the main tenure system for natural resource 
management in Cambodia. The central objective of this system was to put an end to the prevailing 
anarchy in forest and ﬁ sheries management by introducing a “transparent” concession system so 
as to generate revenues for post-war reconstruction efforts in order to create value-added products 
from the timber sector and stimulate local employment (Hibou 2004). 
These virtuous aims were not aligned with the then prevailing political context of the 1990s, which 
was characterized by post-war political struggles between factions of the new governmental coali-
tion (the Cambodia People’s Party (CPP) and Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, 
Neutre, Paciﬁ que, et Cooperative (National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and 
Cooperative Cambodia) (FUNCINPEC) and the continued war with the Khmer Rouge (KR) in the 
Northwest. The reconstruction of patronage networks by each party of the new coalition seeking 
to control the country generated violent political struggles. The need for both parties to generate 
revenue intensiﬁ ed the recourse to grant forest, ﬁ sheries and land concessions. Indeed, the public-
private partnership ideal—created by the international community to assist reconstruction—resulted 
in a destructive and uncontrolled privatization of state natural resources to serve the interests of 
political and military leaders (Global Witness 2007; McKenney and Prom 2002). 
Between 1994 and 2001, 39 percent of the 180,000 square kilometres that constitute Cambodian 
territory was allocated to forest concessions comprising 51 areas totalling 7,084,215 hectares and 
covering more than half of the forest resources at that time (Save Cambodia’s Wildlife 2006) (Map 3). 
In the ﬁ sheries sector, the total area of the ﬁ shing concessions (ﬁ shing lots) that were auctioned was 
953,740 hectares, representing 5.2 percent of Cambodian national territory (McKenney and Prom 
2002). The state did not turn to granting agricultural land on a rapid and large scale until somewhat 
later, and yet during the 1990s the granting of agricultural concessions (palm oil, cassava, rubber, 
cashew and sugar cane) was already on the move. As of 31 December 2001, the total area under 
agricultural concessions in Cambodia was 809,296 ha, leased to 40 companies (McKenney and Prom 
2002). All of these concessions are displayed on Map 3.
The development of a concession economy served important processes tied to the ending of the civil 
war and to the determination of Hun Sen—one of the coalition government’s two prime ministers—
to concentrate power for himself and his political party, the CPP. First, in a move to offer alternative 
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livelihood solutions for demobilized soldiers, both of the coalition’s prime ministers allocated land to 
the army. In July 1994, in seven provinces, an area equivalent to 5 percent of the total Cambodian 
territory was allocated to the military (Degen et al. 2000; Global Witness 2007; Hibou 2004). Second, 
this concession system allowed a progressive centralization and control of power by Hun Sen at the 
expense of opposition leaders and even of his rivals within the CPP. The army and police were placed 
progressively under his control. This resulted in a fusion of economic, political, military, judicial and 
even religious power at all levels (Marchal 2004). Third, the activities initiated by concessionaires 
promoted the development of a myriad entrepreneurial activities involving resource extraction at 
sub-national level. The entrepreneurs involved were usually sub-contractors of main concessionaires 
but they were also well connected to sub-national authorities. 
In this context it is not surprising that the conception, implementation and control of concession 
activities suffered from major deﬁ ciencies on the part of state administrators, the concessionaires 
and their sub-leasers (Hibou 2004; McKenney and Prom 2002). The absence of properly allocated 
human and ﬁ nancial resources made it virtually impossible to control the activities of concessionaires 
on the ground. Concession contracts did not include speciﬁ c forest management measures that 
would allow for the regeneration of species, etc. The exploitation of resources occurred not just 
within concession areas, but also frequently outside. There was no independent judicial system that 
could have conducted proper arbitration of the many conﬂ icts.
In the 1990s, the revenue generated from concession operations was immense, particularly in the 
forest sector, yet only a tiny proportion reached the national treasury (Le Billon 2002). A signiﬁ cant 
fraction of these informal revenues generated by forest exploitation and trade was captured by pro-
vincial and district authorities, members of the military and policemen, political party representatives 
and high-level civil servants (McKenney and Prom 2002). There was little incentive at sub-national 
MAP 3: Forest, fi sheries and agricultural concessions
and Protected Areas as of the early 2000s
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level to actually put an end to the concession system since it gave enough freedom and beneﬁ ts to 
key sub-national actors so that no-one really questioned it. The social and territorial dynamics revolv-
ing around large concession activities—decided at the highest level of the state—allowed a variety 
of actors to become involved in similar processes at the sub-national level under the discretion of 
provincial, district or commune authorities (Diepart 2007). In the end, this process was key to the 
consolidation of the whole political hierarchy of the ruling party from national down to village level. 
In the 1990s, this dynamic led to massive and illicit land acquisitions in the Cambodian countryside 
and to de facto privatization of state resources. The corollary was a decrease in access to the common-
pool resources, which had a profoundly negative impact on rural livelihoods especially those of the 
more vulnerable households (Diepart 2010).
THE 2001 LAND LAW: A CORNERSTONE
IN CONTEMPORARY LAND REFORMS 
The 1990s had thrust the peasants into turmoil, and, in the early 2000s, land tenure management 
was in a deep institutional crisis. Conﬂ icts revolving around access to, and control of, land and 
natural resources were rampant. In attempts to tackle those issues, the government of Cambodia 
ﬁ rst established new laws and regulations. The priority was to create a strong legal basis to allow for 
the establishment of land tenure institutions capable of limiting the impact of land conﬂ icts while 
ensuring the socio-economic development of the country. This is the context in which the Land Law 
of August 2001 was promulgated. It is also the reason why this law was not the synthesis of an 
inter-sectorial reﬂ ection on the challenges and stakes involved in terms of rural development.
 The new Land Law, promulgat-
ed in August 2001 (Royal Gov-
ernment of Cambodia 2001), 
was rooted in the ﬁ rst civil code 
adopted by the French in 1920. 
The Land Law differentiates be-
tween five different domains 
of property (Figure 1). The land 
continues to be owned by the 
state unless its ownership has 
been legally privatized. This 
privatization can happen only 
to state land that does not 
have a public interest (roads, 
mountains, military bases, or 
land where a public service 
is delivered such as a school, 
an administrative post, public 
hospital land or land that has 
a natural origin such as forest, 
water bodies, river beds, and 
so on). State land with a public 
interest is called “state public land”. In contrast, “state private land”, deﬁ ned simply as all state land 
that is not state public land, is the term for all state land that can be legally privatized. The private 
domain includes all land that has full legal private ownership. There is also ownership of Buddhist 
properties that exist within the premises of Buddhist monasteries, and the indigenous community 
land properties where indigenous communities have established residence and where they carry out 
their traditional swidden agriculture. Both monastery and commune property rights suppose collec-
tive ownership over land (East-West Management Institute 2003).
FIGURE 1: Land property categories
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The core objective of the reform is two-fold. First, it aims to improve tenure security and access to land 
through a market-based land distributive reform (relying on land titling, cadastral administration and 
land markets) and redistributive land reform through Social Land Concessions. Second, the reform 
aims to stimulate investment to improve productivity and agricultural diversity under the rubric of 
the “economic concession”. These elements are central in different inﬂ uential World Bank strategic 
papers relating to Cambodia (World Bank 2007a) and, not surprisingly, in the different national 
development master plans (Royal Government of Cambodia 2005a; 2006a).The implementation of 
the Land Law embraced a number of “new” formalization processes of land property rights along 
paths that are summarized in Figure 2. Central to these processes is the formalization of private or 
collective property rights from state property (domain) and the differentiation between state private 
and state public land. This is highly contentious because concessions have remained a central ele-
ment of state land management in Cambodia (despite the ﬁ asco of the 1990s). 
A concession is a legal right established by contract with a competent authority given to any person 
to occupy and use a speciﬁ c piece of state private land for any speciﬁ c purpose. There are three types 
of land concessions: Social Land Concessions (SLCs); Economic Land Concessions (ELCs); and use, 
development and exploitation concessions (UDEC). UDECs are governed by a separate law. 
The privatization of peasants’ land property rights, which supposes a conversion from possession 
to inalienable ownership right (ﬁ gure 2), comprises a further problematic aspect of the 2001 Land 
Law. The law states that “possessors” are people who started occupation of state private land in 
ways that were open, peaceful, continuous, etc. Once the occupation had lasted for at least ﬁ ve 
years, the possessor was entitled to ownership. But in contrast to all preceding Cambodian laws 
and practices, the 2001 law does not allow possession to be based on occupation that starts on or 
after the effective date of the law (Articles 30 and 31). This means that the practice of clearing and 
temporary occupation leading to legal possession that existed in the 1992 law was no longer allowed.
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LAND REFORMS IN LOWLAND CENTRAL PLAINS 
Our journey into contemporary land reforms starts in the lowland central plain. In order to assess 
how land reforms tackle land [in]security and support the enhancement of agricultural productivi-
ties (land and labour), we examine how processes of differentiation in land access are at play in the 
central plains and how the land formalization processes address them.
Land access differentiation in the central plains
In the central plains, the rising incidence of landlessness, land concentration, and atomization, and 
the decline of landholding size per household create big challenges for farming households (Chan 
and Acharya 2002; World Bank 2006; 2013). In the lowland area a growing number of households 
(more than 25 percent) live with less than 0.5 ha of land, which is not enough to sustain a family 
throughout the year (Taylor 2011).
Three processes of land access differentiation explain this situation: 
● Those who were able to acquire more land during Krom Samaki (because the household had 
more active labour and/or because it could appropriate cattle or equipment possessed before 
the war) are usually those who today have larger landholdings (i.e. several hectares). Conversely, 
households with smaller landholdings are young households and have acquired their land mainly 
through inheritance, usually from elders who themselves received land from Krom Samaki. This 
double age-biased phenomenon of land concentration and atomization is observable across 
the central plain. The reason why the legacy of this distribution still lingers is because the 2001 
Land Law blocks any acquisition of land not possessed before 2001, and has somehow ﬁ xed the 
important patterns of land distribution between households. 
● Land transfer in the period that followed the distribution by Krom Samaki was not well regulated 
particularly in the 1990s. Certain households were able to access land in the forest periphery 
of the village kept as reserved land by local authorities. Access to this peripheral land, usually in 
the forested or ﬂ ooded commons, was possible through either reclamation of land (secondary 
forestland) possessed by the household prior to the war or was contingent on good connections 
with commune and/or district authorities. In addition, starting in 2001—when the Land Law 
which forbade the clearance of forestland was passed—land was negotiated ﬁ nancially in certain 
cases with local authorities (virtually a land purchase). Nowadays, the intense land speculation 
by companies or individuals in respect of state land has made access to additional land through 
clearing more difﬁ cult. 
● Land purchase and sale markets are substantially wealth-biased. The ability of households to 
acquire land though land purchase depends on their capacity to mobilize capital. In all of our 
surveys there was a highly signiﬁ cant correlation between total income (and other wealth prox-
ies) and the total purchased land area. Approximately 75 percent of all land sale transactions 
were motivated by factors that are non-productive (health reasons, basic household expenditure 
and debt payment) and were propelled by household vulnerability. In a wider perspective, the 
uncontrolled recourse to market for land transactions has exacerbated the private enclosure of 
land and disembedded it from its social fabric.
Land titling
An important element of the current land reform is the implementation of land titling which rests 
on the assumption that inalienable private property rights should be granted to people in order to 
raise the security of their tenure. Another dimension of the current neo-liberal reform is the reliance 
on functioning markets to enable the transfers of land between users, i.e. farmers. When combined, 
these processes are supposed to promote pro-poor growth resulting from an aggregate productivity 
effect (as land is transferred from lower value to higher value uses), and an income distribution ef-
fect (improved livelihoods and incomes of land-scarce households) (de Soto 2000; Deininger 2003).
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As indicated on Map 4, the areas targeted by the titling efforts are exclusively located in the central 
lowland plain where the decentralized and locally-driven distribution of land to the households by 
the Krom Samaki had allowed the peaceful creation of secured land tenure arrangements (So 2009) .
In these central areas, titling efforts were targeted towards “high capacity areas”, in and around rural 
market centres, where transport and credit services were more developed or in rice farming areas 
where land tenure was more stable and could thus provide more beneﬁ ts relative to the time and 
expense of issuing titles (Ballard 2010; Biddulph 2010; Diepart 2007b). Grimsditch et al. (2009) argue 
that titling conducted by LMAP (Land Management and Administration Project) was an exclusionary 
process in that it precisely avoided directing efforts to those who were most vulnerable to eviction. 
So (2009) likewise suggests that much of the problem in the systematic land registration lies with the 
registration of subsequent land transfers which involves a multi-stage procedure within a bureaucracy 
with high and unpredictable costs, which the peasants are reluctant to pay.
MAP 4: Location of areas (communes) where systematic land registration
had been conducted as of February 2013
MIGRATION AND THE MOVE OUT OF POVERTY
The extension of landholding through the principles of appropriation “by the plough” is no longer 
possible at the periphery of most villages on the ﬂ oodplain even if this has been an historical trend 
in the life of Cambodian peasants. This process is constrained by law and by the privatization of 
the commons. In a context of demographic growth and land atomization through inheritance com-
bined with land acquisition/sale has led inevitably to land concentration. As of 2011, 47 percent of 
households had less than 1 ha of agricultural land while 12 percent had landholdings larger than 3 
hectares (Phann et al. 2015). So what options do land-scarce households have in the central plains? 
Not many, but migrations have been of considerable importance over the past 15-20 years.
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Indeed, there is much evidence to suggest that an increase in the mobility of the population and its 
redistribution through migration, both within and beyond the national border, have been central 
in the recent development of Cambodia. According to the 2008 demographic census, 3,457,228 
people were considered to be internal migrants (in that they had changed their area of residence 
inside Cambodia), 25.8 percent of the total population.
Moving to the city
A relatively important migration is the movement from rural villages to the city, mostly to Phnom 
Penh. According to the National Institute of Statistics (2009), rural-to-urban migrants represent 28 
percent of the total migrant population. Migrants to Phnom Penh come from every corner of the 
country but migration follows a basic ‘gravity model’ in that there are concentrations of migrants 
from provinces with large populations that are close-by, most notably Kampong Cham, Svay Rieng, 
Prey Veng and Takeo (Ministry of Planning 2012). Other urban centres and cross-border towns 
(Siem Reap, Battambang, Kampong Cham, Sihanoukville and Poipet) also have a clear positive net 
in-migration rate (Map 5).
The invisible fl ow: rural-to-rural migrations 
Another migrant ﬂ ow has, however, remained practically unnoticed in Cambodia over the past 15 
years. This involves people moving from one rural place to another. Bruno Maltoni (2006) has called 
it ’the invisible ﬂ ow’ to emphasize that it occurs off the radar of most planners and researchers. The 
phenomenon is not insigniﬁ cant: it is nearly twice the rural-to-urban migration rate (representing 51 
percent versus 28 percent of the total number of migrants). To shed light on internal migrations, we 
have framed the analysis to the period 1997-2008 in order to form an accurate picture of recent trends. 
Map 5 shows quite a striking contrast. The districts with a positive migratory dynamic (shown in red 
on the map) are rural districts located in the upland peripheral regions, on both the east and west 
sides of the Tonle Sap plain and the Mekong delta. In-migration has been particularly important in 
the Northwest, and reﬂ ects a movement of populations, mainly from the Mekong delta and Tonle 
Sap basin, suffering land shortages in these rice growing lands and seeking to acquire land in the 
forested areas near to the border between Cambodia and Thailand. These districts are character-
ized by high population growth rates indicating that migration plays an important role in the overall 
population change in those areas. The districts with a negative migratory dynamic (shown in green 
on the map) are essentially located in the Cambodian central plains (Tonle Sap plain and Mekong 
delta). Overall, these trends suggest a migration-related loss of population from lowland rice-based 
to upland regions (rural-to-rural) on the one hand and to urban centres (rural-to-urban) on the other. 
A signiﬁ cant number of the rural-to-rural migration events that have taken place between communes 
within the same district are not visible here in this district-level net migration rate.
We have shown that the high population density makes access to land more competitive in the central 
plains and strengthens a process of land concentration. These constraints are further complicated by 
limited possibilities for agricultural intensiﬁ cation and by the restricted opportunities for acquiring 
non-farm jobs (Chheang and Dulioust 2012; Pilgrim et al. 2012). To a large extent, these migrations 
can be seen as an expression of the agency of peasant households in responding to rural poverty. 
They are also the expression of an on-going trend on the part of the Cambodian peasant to consider 
the principle of appropriation “by the plough” as a legitimate mode of land acquisition, which has 
been a consistent trend throughout Cambodian agrarian history.
As indicated earlier, the Land Law forbade the acquisition of forestland (i.e. state public land) after 
2001. Land appropriations resulting from these migrations were completely at odds with the land 
legal framework that authorities were supposed to implement. This has resulted in a huge popula-
tion living on land that they appropriated after 2001 in respect of which they have virtually no land 
tenure security under the 2001 Land Law institutions. This is a problem that local authorities have 
addressed locally and is subject to a diversity of local rules. However, elites close to central power 
and the concessionaires have been perfectly aware of this situation.
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The responses by state authorities to these migrations have been contradictory. We can perhaps 
speculate that the authorities were perfectly aware of these movements but, as they conveyed 
contradictions, it was perhaps best not to publicize them. National authorities were probably not 
unhappy to see spontaneous migration taking place as these movements were helping to solve 
poverty issues in the central plains that the government was unable or unwilling to tackle. In the 
destination region this migratory activity was exploited by local authorities as land appropriation by 
migrants legitimized their authority in land control through a process of dialectical constitution of 
land rights and authority (Diepart and Dupuis 2014).
LAND REFORMS IN PERIPHERAL UPLAND AREAS
State land management
In its strategy framework for land policy (Royal Government of Cambodia 2002b), the government 
foresees the creation of a state land inventory and state land classiﬁ cation system in order to “clearly 
protect areas of public interest and maximize the beneﬁ t to the state from the granting of, sale, lease 
and concession or possession rights of land in the private domain”. The “beneﬁ t to the state” is a 
rather complex notion, subject to different and contradictory interpretations. This debate is central 
to contemporary land reform, particularly in this political economy context.
A sub-decree foresees the mechanisms for state land management and state land classiﬁ cation (Royal 
Government of Cambodia 2005c) but in reality it has proceeded only marginally due to a lack of 
interest and resources on the part of the government. The lack of government commitment to state 
land mapping and classiﬁ cation was highlighted by the World Bank in a landmark LMAP review report 
in 2009 (World Bank 2009). The government did not take up these World Bank recommendations 
MAP 5: Net migration rate per district over the period 1997-2008
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and decided instead to cancel the USD 24.3 million World Bank contribution (loan) to the land titling 
project (Zsombor and Phorn 2010).
The process of state land classiﬁ cation and mapping seems rather to work by default with the grant-
ing of economic concessions (which require the transfer of land from public state to private state) 
and by occasionally granting Social Land Concessions and community entitlements. The inefﬁ ciency 
of state land management is also due to the absence of a sound and multi-level integrated land use 
planning system that would develop, organize and protect the entire territory through integrative 
and strategic territorial planning mechanisms (Thiel 2010).
Large-scale land acquisition through Economic Land Concessions
After the ﬁ asco of concessions management in the 1990s the government, with the support of donors 
(World Bank and Asian Development Bank), reintroduced the idea that [agro-industrial] concessions 
could be (would be) central to inclusive development in Cambodia. The implementation of Economic 
Land Concessions was expected to result in new types of large-scale investments in rural Cambodia, to 
stimulate agro-industrial activities requiring a large capital investment that the state did not have, and 
to develop so-called “under-utilized” land. They would increase employment in rural areas, offer new 
opportunities for labour and employment in the countryside, and encourage local economic diversiﬁ -
cation through small and large investments upstream and downstream of the concession. They would 
also generate state revenue at national and sub-national levels. The rhetoric is not essentially different 
from what was intended decades earlier in respect of the forest and ﬁ sheries concession models.
For the government of Cambodia, Economic Land Concessions represent an opportunity to reinvig-
orate the very proﬁ table concessions economy after the collapse of the forest and ﬁ sheries conces-
sions in the 1990s. The opportunities for foreign investment that Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) 
offer have also been seen as a political tool to engage Cambodia in ASEAN integration by allowing 
neighbouring countries (states and companies) to invest in the Kingdom.
The granting and implementation of ELCs has not been a smooth process and we can distinguish 
four different phases. 
● In the period prior to the promulgation of the Land Law in August 2001, 18 ELCs (still active 
today) were granted for mostly tree plantation activities to Cambodian investors on production/
conversion forestland. These concessions cover 20 percent of the total area attributed. 
● During the second phase—between the Land Law and the promulgation of the ELC sub-decree 
(see below)—the legal framework for ELCs was not fully in place. A small number of ELCs were 
granted (11 percent of the total) in a manner very similar to that in the previous phase. 
● With the release of the sub-decree in December 2005 (Royal Government of Cambodia 2005b), 
and the setting up of the Technical Secretariat and ad hoc provincial committees (Sperfeldt et al. 
2012), the number of ELC contracts has increased and the nature of ELCs has changed. Starting 
in 2008, the increase in demand and prices for rubber fuelled a rush for rubber production in 
Cambodia (Global Witness 2013). The rubber lobby seems powerful because, starting in 2008, 
Economic Land Concessions for rubber production were granted in Protected Areas (under the 
management of the Ministry of Environment) and in Protection Forests (under the management of 
the Forestry Administration). And the rush for land was further intensiﬁ ed when the World Bank 
put forward the idea to bring large-scale investments into the Cambodian countryside (World 
Bank 2007a). This move echoed the global strategy of the Bank to reintegrate agriculture as a 
key growth driver in the rural South (World Bank 2007b), and has been further reinforced in a 
subsequent World Bank strategic paper (Deininger et al. 2011).
● In 2012, the number of new ELCs dipped sharply as a result of the moratorium on ELCs ordered 
by the prime minister Hun Sen, which suggests some engagement of the government in halting 
the granting of new agreements. Despite the moratorium, however, a number of ELC contracts 
(at least 33) were signed after May 2012 on the grounds that permission for this had been given 
prior to the moratorium (ADHOC 2014; Zsombor and Aun 2012).
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ELCs are limited to land measuring no more than10,000 ha and are granted for a maximum of 99 
years. ELC contracts are subject to payment on the part of the concessionaires. There are no condi-
tions with respect to who can apply for an ELC and no restriction on foreigners obtaining concession 
contracts. An ELC must be developed within 12 months after issuance otherwise the contract will be 
cancelled. Additionally, the sub-decree stipulates a number of safeguards to avoid adverse impacts 
on the local population, such as the production of a land use plan, designed and approved locally, 
and solutions for re-settlement. In addition, environment and social impact assessments must be 
conducted, and public consultations held with local authorities and residents (Sperfeldt et al. 2012).
It is difﬁ cult to formulate an accurate picture of the location, size and status of all Economic Land 
Concessions. Overall, three elements explain this problem. First, there is a clear lack of transparency 
in the attribution of ELC contracts and it is not in the interests of the actors concerned to always 
provide full clarity about those deals. In inventories made public by the government, not all the con-
cessions are listed (Boyle and May 2012). Second, some ELC contracts have also been terminated by 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), but the procedure for these cancellations 
does not seem to follow a systematic path. Third, there can be a signiﬁ cant divergence between 
the area size speciﬁ ed in the concession contract and the actual area size of the concession on the 
ground (13 percent more according to our dataset). 
Given all these limitations, our dataset suggests that 2,547,718 ha of land had been granted as ELCs 
by the end of December 2012. This encompasses 271 contracts including ELCs that were cancelled 
afterwards. Among these, 86 ELC contracts (32 percent of the total) have an area size exceeding 
the legal limit of 10,000 ha. All ELCs are located in the peripheral uplands on both sides of the Tonle 
Sap Great Lake, with a higher concentration in the Northeast (Map 6). According to our dataset, 
37 percent of the total area consists of rubber plantations, by far the most important crop. In 2011, 
MAFF signed a deal with its Vietnamese counterpart granting 300,000 ha to grow rubber (Voice 
of Vietnam 2011). Map 6 also indicates that a signiﬁ cant number of ELCs for rubber plantations 
MAP 6: Distribution of ELCs in Cambodia by type of crop/investment
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have been issued inside Protected Areas. Tree plantations (Acacia auriculiformis, Eucalyptus sp., and 
Tectona grandis) represent 27 percent of the total area allocated. Unspeciﬁ ed agro-industrial crops 
are also important in terms of the land size they cover, as are ELCs relating to oil palm and sugar 
cane (Map 6).
There is a broad consensus in Cambodia among NGOs and researchers that the process of author-
izing and implementing Economic Land Concessions shows clear deviations from the established 
legal and policy framework (Sperfeldt et al. 2012). Public consultations and social and environmental 
impact assessments that should be carefully undertaken before any agreement is signed are rarely 
conducted properly, if at all (Sperfeldt et al. 2012). 
Furthermore, during the implementation of these large-scale agricultural investments, a number of 
irregularities are also reported as routine issues. In certain instances, ELC contracts have been signed 
to by-pass the 2002 ban on logging, given that ELC implementation pre-supposes the clearing of 
the land before the establishment of agro-industrial plantations (the sub-decree on ELC is explicit 
about this). The case of the rubber plantation in Tumring (Kampong Thom) made jurisprudence on 
the matter (Global Witness 2007). In such cases, logging operations are conducted well beyond the 
boundaries of the concession area (Hibou 2004). More recently, ﬁ ne-grained ﬁ eld investigations into 
present day forest exploitation in Cambodia have showed that ELCs continue to be signed as a way 
to circumvent the ban on logging operations (Global Witness 2015; Pye and May 2014).
Partly connected to these logging operations inside ELCs, another abuse frequently reported is the 
under-utilisation of land (Hibou 2004; Sperfeldt et al. 2012). The agro-industrial development that 
was supposed to take place on ELC ground has not taken place, resulting in a failure to cultivate the 
land. A survey by the UNDP (cited in Sperfeldt et al, 2012), revealed that, as of 2005, only 2 percent 
of the land under concession was being actively cultivated.
Very often the land granted to concessionaires is already occupied and/or cultivated by people. Basic 
ﬁ eld visits to these sites would have sufﬁ ced to make this clear—not to mention a social impact 
assessment. In those cases, logging or land clearing operations have led to land dispossession and 
forced evictions that are conducted by military forces, sometimes even acting as private security 
services for concession companies. Human rights violations associated with these evictions have 
been consistent in the conclusions of reports and public declarations by successive United Nations 
High Commissioners for Human Rights in Cambodia (Ghai 2007; Leuprecht 2004; Subedi 2012).
An even more pernicious effect of the concession system is what some scholars have called neo-
patrimonialism. In Cambodia, neo-patrimonialism has occurred through the use of national natural 
resources to serve the private interests of the elite and to consolidate their power through patronage-
based distributive practices (Milne 2013; Sok 2014; Un and So 2009).
Redistributive land reform: the Social Land Concessions programme
Social Land Concessions (SLCs) are tools the government has promoted to address the problem of 
landlessness and near landlessness. The problem of landlessness was already an issue in the 1990s 
and was further exacerbated by the return of war refugees from the camps located in the North-
west of Cambodia along the Thai border. Landlessness had also increased through market-based 
land dispossession initiated in the 1980s (see above) and by the increasing number of demobilized 
soldiers. As indicated earlier, access to vacant land by appropriation had become illegal after 2001 
so the government needed to have a speciﬁ c instrument for land redistribution that could address 
landlessness and correct the so-called undesired effects of the market-based distributive land reform.
SLCs imply a legal mechanism to transfer private state land for social purposes to the poor (landless 
or near landless) who lack land for residential and/or family farming purposes. This is further detailed 
in the procedure for granting and managing SCL schemes in a sub-decree (Royal Government of 
Cambodia 2003). There are two types of SLCs: local and national. The basic difference between them 
lies in how they are initiated. Local SLCs are initiated through commune councils, and national SLCs 
are initiated through relevant ministries. Under the SLC programme, concession (sambathian) rights 
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are very similar to possession (paukeas), at least for the ﬁ rst ﬁ ve years. If a Social Land Concession 
recipient remains on the land for a period of ﬁ ve years and follows legal duties, he/she can apply to 
convert the concession rights to ownership (Figure 2)
According to the Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction (MLMUPC), as 
of June 2014, the total number of recipients of the Social Land Concession programme was 12,374 
families in respect of 113,167 ha of land registered (for settlement, infrastructure and agriculture). 
This represents only 4 percent of the total area granted as Economic Land Concessions! 
The procedure and mechanisms of SLCs are very time-consuming for authorities and we suggest that 
there is a clear lack of political will on the part of the government to implement a more ambitious 
SLC policy. It seems that there is competition between Economic Land Concessions and Social Land 
Concessions in the allocation of state land by state representatives. Volker Müller, team leader of the 
GIZ-supported Land Rights Programme at MLMUPC, suggests three main reasons why the donor-
driven SLC programme is not performing well: i) it does not address the complexity of social, political 
and legal assemblages in the uplands, ii) it is not properly integrated with other land distribution 
instruments such as the regulation of unauthorised land use and iii) clear articulation between SLC 
and ELC schemes is often lacking (Müller 2012).
Forest and fi sheries resources co-management
At the end of the 1990s, the concession system was at an impasse. The 2002 moratorium (still in 
force today) declared that all logging operations (for national trade and export) were forbidden in 
the country; this declaration did not put an end to all logging operations but it marked an important 
turning point in the management of forests in the Kingdom. The reforms engaged by the government 
are comprehensive. They aim to reduce or cancel large parts of forest and ﬁ sheries concessions. This 
institutional reform of the administrations in charge includes a new law on forestry (Royal Govern-
ment of Cambodia 2002) and a new law on ﬁ sheries (Royal Government of Cambodia 2006b) that 
prepare the ground for the emergence and implementation of more community-based natural re-
source management. These new management modalities aim to ensure the sustainable management 
of natural resources, biodiversity conservation and the protection of peasant production systems. The 
approach rests on the premise that local communities living close to the resources are best suited 
to manage these resources sustainably: locals know the local ecosystems better than anyone else, 
they are in a better position to identify management problems affecting those ecosystems and to 
identify possible solutions (Li 2002).
But in Cambodia, the increased attention given to local-level natural resource management should 
be considered as a national programme initiated by the ministries supported by donor organizations 
rather than a movement by the community members themselves for more autonomy. The gradual 
devolution of natural resource management has taken place in a context where the concession 
system has been in total chaos and co-management has been somehow a recognition by the state 
of its own failure to ensure sustainable resource management (Hobley 2007). At the same time, 
the devolution of natural resource management to the grassroots level has represented a renewed 
opportunity for the state to exercise control over natural resources while externalizing the costs of 
the operational management and monitoring.
The system of community-based natural resource management does not mean that the state has 
decentralized all of its rights and prerogatives. From a property rights point of view this transfer of 
responsibilities to local communities implies the transformation of either a concession (forest-ﬁ sheries) 
or a so-called open access into co-management tenure regimes. To enjoy Community Forestry or 
Community Fisheries rights, a “community” must be formally constituted with registered members 
and an elected management committee. Internal rules need to be written in a by-law, and resource 
management plans, with clear beneﬁ t-sharing mechanisms, need to be designed and approved by 
the administration. The community entitlement area needs to be demarcated on a map and on the 
ground before a management agreement (for 15 years) can be signed by both parties. A careful 
reading of relevant sub-decrees shows that, under these co-management schemes, the state keeps 
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large prerogatives over the resources: these include commercial exploitation of timber or com-
mercial ﬁ shing activities, tax collections in cases of illegal activities and even the extension of the 
co-management agreement.
In early 2000, the overall area of forest concessions had been drastically reduced from the initial high 
of 7,084,215 ha to 2,163,600 ha (Save Cambodia’s Wildlife 2006). As an alternative, the Forestry 
Administration and donors alike started to encourage the establishment of community-based forest 
management schemes. Thirteen years after the release of the sub-decree on Community Forestry 
(Royal Government of Cambodia 2003), the contribution of community forests remains modest. The 
most recent data indicates that there are 235 Community Forestry schemes in the country cover-
ing a total surface area of 537,828 ha (Save Cambodia’s Wildlife 2014), still far from the target of 
2,000,000 ha (Ty 2009). 
To the constraints imposed by the weak security of tenure in respect of co-management schemes, the 
fact that most Community Forestry areas are those of degraded forest should be added (Independent 
Forest Sector Review 2004). The best forest areas are usually turned into Economic Land Concessions.
Similarly, the area covered by ﬁ shing concessions was reduced by 56 percent in 2001 (Mom 2009). 
In areas released from ﬁ shing lots, the Fisheries Administration and donors have encouraged the 
establishment of Community Fisheries. In 2012, the remaining ﬁ shing lot system was totally abol-
ished. According to most recent statistics there are 447 Community Fisheries throughout the country 
involving 115,000 families (Save Cambodia’s Wildlife 2014) (Map 7). 
Despite an increased attention to local issues and an engagement in support of social justice, the 
co-management approach has not been able to effectively enhance the conditions enjoyed by rural 
communities for a number of reasons detailed next.
MAP 7: Remaining forest concessions (as of 2011) and forest
and fi sheries co-management schemes (as of 2014)
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Primarily supported by international organizations, co-management was envisaged by a large number 
of NGOs as a stepping-stone for fundraising. Co-management programmes have mushroomed across 
the country and have also served to support an emerging urban middle-class of new professionals. 
In order to provide an interface between the community and the state, management committees 
were quickly legitimized by democratic elections in the villages. But these committees and their ac-
tions were rarely articulated to peasant associations anchored in the local territories and histories. 
These new governance bodies were actually more instrumental in facilitating dialogue between the 
state and the community but they did not enjoy a strong legitimacy with local groups. 
Guided usually by good intentions, practitioners have privileged technical solutions for the manage-
ment of resources at the local level. The political dialogue with the state, essential in deﬁ ning the 
overall contribution of rural communities to natural resource management, was somehow neglected. 
This institutional gap did not allow for a proper recognition of local communities as central actors 
in the management of the commons.
In addition, implementation of co-management on the ground has tried to conform to the different 
interests and rationality of actors in the community. But communities are not socially homogenous. 
Instead they are highly hierarchical along the lines of asymmetric patronage relations (Ledgerwood 
and Vijghen 2002). This heterogeneity is also manifested in the diversity of roles played by common-
pool resources in production systems. The degree of participation of a family in co-management 
efforts always depends on the labour opportunity costs and the beneﬁ ts the family expects to receive. 
Local practitioners have not always been able to capture these differences. So what have been the 
results? Resource co-management has reinforced local elites and instituted new relationships of 
dependency between those elites and the forest/ﬁ sheries administrations, usually at the expense of 
the poor and most vulnerable. 
Resource co-management, as implemented in Cambodia, has introduced a principle of community 
exclusivity on the access, use and management of the resources, which is quite at odds with the 
endogenous logic of land and resource management of the commons. This principle—applied to 
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new community territories—has actually reinforced and stimulated the over-exploitation of resources 
in places where this exclusivity principle is not applied and where unregulated privatization of the 
resources has resulted in a tragedy of the commons sensu Hardin (1968). 
But the development of co-management was a very important response to the general outcry against 
the fragmentation of territories that accompanied the granting of Economic Land Concessions across 
the country. To sum up, we argue that the rallying of communities to the development of natural 
resource co-management has more to do with the need to protect Cambodian commons against 
those external interests than with a genuine need for, and interest in, improving natural resource 
management practices.
Communal land titling
The possibility offered by the 2001 Land Law to grant communal land titling is particularly signiﬁ cant 
as it was the ﬁ rst time in Cambodian history that this had occurred (Save Cambodia’s Wildlife 2014). 
Communal land titling has been integrally linked and restricted to the idea of indigenous people. It 
thus relates to 1 to 1.7 percent of the population.
Indigenous people are deﬁ ned in the 2001 Land Law as a group of people who reside in the terri-
tory of the Kingdom of Cambodia whose members manifest ethnic (non-Khmer), social, cultural and 
economic unity, who practise a traditional lifestyle, and who cultivate the lands in their possession 
according to customary rules of collective use (Article 23). Although land use and tenure practices of 
indigenous people can be diverse, they are clustered under the term “swidden agriculture”, a land 
use system that employs a natural or improved fallow phase, which is longer than the cultivation 
phase, with the land then cleared by means of ﬁ re (Mertz et al. 2009). 
Article 25 of the 2001 Land Law clearly speciﬁ es that indigenous communities can exercise collective 
ownership over land where they have established residence and where they carry out traditional 
agriculture. This collective ownership is granted by the state to the indigenous communities but the 
community does not have the right to dispose to any person or group land relating to any collec-
tive ownership that is state public property (Save Cambodia’s Wildlife 2014). The transfer of land to 
private ownership is a possibility available to any member of the community only if he/she decides 
to leave the group (East-West Management Institute 2003). 
In 2009, a sub-decree was brought into effect to establish the legal foundation for the granting of 
collective titles to indigenous communities. The procedures foreseen include three steps: ﬁ rst, the 
designation of the community as “indigenous” by the Ministry of Rural Development; second, the 
registration of the village as a legal entity by the Ministry of Interior; and third the actual issuance 
of the communal land title by the Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction 
(Royal Government of Cambodia 2009).
The land to be transferred by the state under a communal land title is classiﬁ ed in the sub-decree 
into ﬁ ve categories: i) agricultural production and ii) residential land are transferred from state private 
land and iii) lands reserved (fallow) for swidden agriculture, iv) burial and v) spirit forests areas and 
are transferred from state public land (Royal Government of Cambodia 2009).
A total of 114 communities have engaged in the process of applying for a collective title. Of these, 
95 indigenous communities have been recognised as such by the Ministry of Rural Development. 
Among them, only eight have completed the process and received the land titles (six in Mondulkiri 
and two in Ratanakiri) (Narim and Crothers 2014).
Vize and Hornung (2013) rightly point out that the timespan between the enactment of the Land 
Law in 2001 and the promulgation of the sub-decree in 2009 has been too long. In the meantime, 
massive and quick changes, driven by the granting of Economic Land Concessions, illegal logging 
and the demand for new land emerging from peasants who have migrated from the lowlands, have 
put tremendous pressure on the land and resource bases of indigenous people. These changes have 
forced or induced the conversion of swidden to permanent upland agriculture; in those cases, the 
access to communal land titles is not envisaged or desired, or is simply not possible.
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Recently, a convergence of interests between agencies of the United Nations, academics and a group 
of NGOs resulted in the formation of a movement aiming to lobby for more and faster land titling 
(Narim and Crothers 2014; Pye 2013). If the land rights of indigenous people need to be protected, 
past experience has shown that it is unlikely that communal land titling alone will provide secure 
tenure. In order for indigenous people to achieve secure access more effectively, greater attention 
should perhaps be focused on articulating communal land titling with other forms of tenure such as 
Community Forestry areas, Community Protected Areas, forestry partnerships, and suchlike.
Addressing ’irregular’ occupation of state land 
A number of decisions have been formulated and issued by the government to address the problem 
of irregular occupation of state land. In areas located within the vicinity of ELCs, these decisions 
promote the notion that land should be reserved and allocated under the mechanisms of Social 
Land Concessions. These are to provide land for future labourers for residential and family farming 
purposes (Sor Cho Nor No. 699, dated 18 May 2007) or as compensation to people who might be 
affected by ELCs (Sor Cho Nor No.1117 dated 1 September 2011). Müller and Zülsdorf (2013) note 
that neither of these decisions has yet been implemented. 
Circular 02 on the “regularization of illegal occupants on state land” was released in 2007 and is 
a more elaborate document to address the issue. This is important because it shows government 
recognition for the fact that illegal state land acquisition is not only driven by speculators but also by 
“real poor families who are truly exploiting land for their livelihoods” (Royal Government of Cambo-
dia 2007). The procedure through which the state can reclaim lands illegally occupied by someone 
is very explicit. The text speciﬁ es that if illegal state landholders are in reality landless, land poor or 
disadvantaged persons, they may receive preferential treatment in obtaining land of an appropriate 
size for pursuing their livelihoods, based on their actual situation. However, the text does not provide 
any further information about how this preferential treatment is to be applied. In addition, Circular 
02 endeavours to address illegal occupation of state land on a case-by-case basis that considerably 
limits the operational capacity of the mechanism. Müller and Zülsdorf (2013) indicate that the ML-
MUPC prepared for the circular’s implementation through studies and the drafting of a technical 
handbook, which covers provision of ownership, usufruct, both long- and short-term leases, Social 
Land Concessions, and conﬁ scation of state land. But as it was unclear who would take the lead, 
the operation and implementation were delayed.
ORDER 01 AND NEW LAND RIGHT FORMALIZATION
On 7 May 2012, the prime minister Hun Sen announced a moratorium on granting Economic Land 
Concessions. The text, entitled “Measures to strengthen and enhance the effectiveness of the man-
agement of Economic Land Concessions (ELCs)” is a document now commonly known as Order 
01. In addition to freezing the granting of ELCs, Order 01 initiated an unprecedented land titling 
campaign in those areas where the land rights of people and companies overlap onto state land. 
Order 01 speciﬁ cally tries to address land security inside the ELCs through private land titling, a 
process Dwyer (2015) calls the “formalization ﬁ x”. However, the implementation has been quite 
different as the adjudication areas for the Order 01 titling scheme were largely expanded to include 
other land categories such as forest concessions, Protected Areas, and forest rehabilitation warrants 
from provincial authorities.
Müller and Zülsdorf (2013) provide a detailed description of how the human resources were mobilized 
and organized to implement titling schemes. The government registration staff totaled 2,000 people 
(1,000 people from the Systematic Land Registration process complemented by around 750 members 
of staff from MLMUPC and also from other ministries). To support the government staff, up to 2015 
young volunteers from 30 universities, institutes, public and private training centres and three NGOs 
were recruited and sent to the ﬁ eld in 168 teams (so-called Krom Niset). Each team comprised up to 
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12 government staff members 
including representatives from 
the Ministry of Interior, Minis-
try of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries, the Ministry of Envi-
ronment and other ministries 
and up to 12 young volunteers. 
The presence of young people 
in supporting the titling pro-
cess drew substantial media 
attention, and the whole initia-
tive became known as “Prime 
Minister Youths land titling 
campaign”.
According to our dataset, 
an area covering a total of 
1,010,429 ha was measured 
under the Order 01 land titling 
initiative of which 92 percent 
(927,848 ha) was formally dis-
tributed to 317,444 families. 
The remaining 8 percent has 
been kept as reserved land for 
future use. Within only a year, 
the outreach of the land titling 
under Order 01 was dramatic 
when compared with the much 
lower ﬁ gure of 625,000 fami-
lies reached through the Sys-
tematic Land Registration efforts over a 10-year period (2002 and 2012). The most important share 
(30 percent) of land excised from state land came from un-categorized forest cover, while only 25 
percent came from ELCs (Figure 3). Interestingly, the dataset speciﬁ es a few other land categories 
where titles were issued which were not initially foreseen (Social Land Concessions). It seems clear 
from these results that the Order 01 titling scheme has been a comprehensive attempt to address the 
problem of insecurity associated with irregular occupation of state land in the Cambodian uplands. 
Comprehensive land titling efforts can also be seen as a further step towards the commodiﬁ cation 
of land in the uplands and the privatization of the commons. These efforts promote private property 
rights as a legitimate alternative property right in areas where collective arrangements of the com-
mons have prevailed throughout history. The titling process has resulted in different responses by 
communities to maintain and protect common property rights. It has already been shown that the 
introduction of private land titles as alternatives to communal land titles in Northeast Cambodia has 
created an institutional schism within communities between those supporting communal ownership 
and those opting for private land titles (Milne 2013).
A fundamental question underlying the land titling process surrounds its implication for land security; 
that is, whether land titling does enhance land security and, if so, how this security differs from the 
land security institutions established before titling occurred. The examination of this process neces-
sitates an examination of the tenure security of land located inside and outside the adjudication area. 
In fact, titling of private land is instrumental in the delineation of the land that is not privatized and 
which then becomes a de facto ﬁ xed state asset. By extension, land security provided on land within 
the adjudication area might consequently reduce land tenure security in areas outside the adjudica-
tion area which were subjected to local recognition (as belonging to someone) (Hirsch 2011). This 
issue of security can be spatially differentiated according to areas where the concession activities are 
in full swing or where the concession is not [yet] active. 
FIGURE 3: Distribution of land excised from state
land under the Order 01 land titling scheme, by size





















Total area = 1,010,429 ha (as of 26.02.214)
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The process has proved to be 
largely incomplete and large 
areas appropriated by people 
have been left untitled. This in-
completeness of land titling in 
areas where people live and/or 
cultivate might give legitimacy 
to the concessionaires or Pro-
tected Area authorities in forc-
ing/evicting those people from 
the delineated land. There are 
also cases of illicit land acquisi-
tion, usually involving outsiders 
who had managed (with the 
help of locals) to clear a piece 
of land and build a house—lit-
erally overnight—in order to 
take advantage of the cheap 
titling services on offer.
The actual implementation of 
titling and the formalization 
of land property rights might 
further reshape labour rela-
tionships between companies 
and local people, for instance 
by providing new wage labour 
opportunities. These oppor-
tunities, if they actually mate-
rialize, might further modify 
land-labour relations between 
households in the neighbour-
ing community. New develop-
ment opportunities or constraints might also come from new investors who want to take advantage 
of titling efforts to grab land and develop small-scale agro-industrial enterprises in conjunction with, 
or separate from, those activities undertaken on ELCs.
The spatial dimension of these recent territorial developments is also important. The formalization 
of land property rights will inevitably result in the ofﬁ cial recognition of new administrative entities 
in the uplands (villages, communes and districts). These rights will generate or exacerbate demands 
for settlements, physical infrastructure (for example, transport, energy and irrigation) and social 
services (including education and health) that will need to be articulated through spatially-explicit 
development strategies.
CONCLUSIONS
Current land tenure regimes in Cambodia are highly fragmented between lowland central plains and 
peripheral uplands. This fragmentation has yielded contradictory and problematic results. 
In the lowland areas, the current trends to modernize land property rights through land titling and 
the promotion of land markets is quite at odds with the historically rooted institutions of peasants 
to appropriate land “by the plough” and to seek land security of tenure predominantly through 
recognition of possession rights legitimized by local authorities through local institutions. We have 
argued that land titling has not radically changed the security of tenure in the central plains, and 
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that the uncontrolled recourse to market for land transactions has exacerbated the private enclosure 
of land and disembedded land from its social fabric. 
In the uplands, land reforms have been mostly implemented in a context of post-war political 
economy fuelled by the extraction of natural resources. The allocation of forest concessions and 
later of agro-industrial concessions by the state has overwritten local land management rules and 
institutions and has considerably undermined the security of peasants’ land tenure. Furthermore, 
the existing state land management instruments, such as Social Land Concessions, communal land 
titling or forestry/ﬁ sheries resources co-management, are far too weak to really address the power 
issues at stake in these upland areas.
This fragmentation is actually sealed in the 2001 Land Law, which restricts legal land possession 
to land occupied before 2001. In a context of high demographic increase and limited opportunity 
to intensify production, these legal dispositions have marginalized the peasant population who are 
expanding their land-holdings. 
A central shortcoming of the current land reform is its failure to articulate the processes of land 
rights formalization in lowland and upland areas, although both regions are closely linked through 
land-driven migration movements that have intensiﬁ ed over the past 20 years. These migratory move-
ments have contributed to a signiﬁ cant redistribution of the rural population between lowland and 
uplands. In a parallel process, and driven by strong state-based political economy, large land deals 
have been concentrated in the uplands of the entire country along processes that are exclusionary in 
nature. It is against the rapid changes unleashed by these ELCs that we present the ineffectiveness 
of other land tenure regimes that are part of state land management in the uplands. Indeed, the 
incompleteness of the land titling process has left large areas untitled and has created new forms of 
land tenure fragmentation in the uplands that are not being addressed.
In order for land access for peasants to be more secure, greater attention should perhaps be given 
to articulating different land tenure regimes in ways that bring peasant movements and migration 
back to the centre of the debate. ●
32
THE FRAGMENTATION OF LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN CAMBODIA:
PEASANTS AND THE FORMALIZATION OF LAND RIGHTS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
● ACHARYA S., S. KIM, S. CHAP and Y. MEACH. 
2003. Off-farm and non-farm employment: A 
persective on job creation in Cambodia, Work-
ing paper no 26. Phnom Penh: Cambodia De-
velopment Resource Institute. 
● ADHOC. 2014. Land situation in Cambodia 
2013. Phnom Penh.
● ASCHMONEIT W. 1995. Cambodian pagoda 
committees and community work. Paper present-
ed at the confrence “Traditional Self Help Organi-
zations and Development”, Sri Lanka: GTZ.
● ASCHMONEIT W. 1998. Traditional self-help 
associations in Cambodia. How to identify and 
cooperate with them. Phnom Penh: Gesellschaft 
für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ).
● BALLARD B. 2010. Land titling in Cambodia: 
Procedural and administrative exclusions. Paper 
presented at the RCSD International Conference 
“Revisiting Agrarian Transformations in South-
east Asia: Empirical, Theoretical and Applied 
Perspectives”, Chiang Mai, Thailand.
● BIDDULPH R. 2000. “Making the poor more 
visible. Landlessness and development research 
report”. In Where has all the land gone. Phnom 
Penh: OxFam G-B Cambodian Land Study 
Project.
● BIDDULPH R. 2010. Geographies of evasion: 
The development industry and property rights 
interventions in early 21st century Cambodia. 
PhD, University of Gothenburg.
● BOYLE D. and T. MAY. 2012. “Not all eco-
nomic land concessions listed”. Phnom Penh 
Post, 5 July.
● CHAN S. 2009. Review of labour migration 
management, policies and legal framework in 
Cambodia, ILO Asia-paciﬁ c working paper se-
ries. Phnom Penh: ILO Regional Ofﬁ ce for Asia 
and the Paciﬁ c. 
● CHAN S. and S. ACHARYA. 2002. Facing the 
challenges of rural livelihoods. A perspective 
from nine villages in Cambodia, Working paper 
no 25. Phnom Penh: Cambodia Development 
Resource Institute. 
● CHANDLER D. 1998. A history of Cambodia. 
2nd ed. Chiang Mai: Silkworms Books. 
● CHHEANG V. and J. DULIOUST. 2012. Rural-
rural migrations in Cambodia, Policy paper. Su-
preme National Economic Council and Agence 
Française de Développement.
● COOPER G. 2002. Land policy and confl ict. The 
Cambodian portion of an eight-country study, 
19: North-South Institute for the World Bank.
● DE SOTO H. 2000. Mystery of capital. New 
York: Basic Books. 
● DEGEN P., F. VAN ACKER, N. VAN ZALINGE, T. 
NAO and V. LY. 2000. Taken for granted: Con-
fl icts over Cambodia’s freshwater fi sh resources. 
Paper presentat at the 8th IASCP Conference, 
Bloomington, Indiana.
● DEININGER K. 2003. Land policies for growth 
and poverty reduction World Bank policy re-
search report. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
● DEININGER K., D. BYERLEE, J. LINDSAY, A. 
NORTON, H. SELOD and M. STICKLER. 2011. 
Rising global interest in farmland. Can it yield 
sustainable and equitable benefi ts? Washington: 
World Bank. 
● DESBARATS J. 1995. Prolifi c survivors. Popula-
tion change in Cambodia, 1975-1993. Tempe: 
Arizona State University. 
● DIEPART J.-C. 2007. Problèmes et enjeux de 
l’économie rurale au Cambodge : entre nou-
velles gouvernances et réalités paysannes. Le cas 
de la province de Kampong Thom. PhD, Fac-
ulté Universitaire des Sciences Agronomiques 
de Gembloux.
● DIEPART J.-C. 2010. “Cambodian peasant’s 
contribution to rural development: A perspective 
from Kampong Thom province”. Biotechnology, 
Agronomy, Societies and Environment 14, no. 2: 
321-340.
● DIEPART J.-C. and D. DUPUIS. 2014. “The 
peasants in Turmoil: Khmer Rouge, state forma-
tion and the control of land in northwest Cam-
bodia”. Journal of Peasant Studies 41, no. 4: 
445-468.
33
THE FRAGMENTATION OF LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN CAMBODIA:
PEASANTS AND THE FORMALIZATION OF LAND RIGHTS
● DWYER M. B. 2015. “The formalization ﬁ x? 
Land titling, land concessions and the politics 
of spatial transparency in Cambodia”. Journal 
of Peasant Studies, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0
3066150.2014.994510
● EAST-WEST MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE. 2003. 
Land law of Cambodia. A study and research 
manual. Phnom Penh. 
● FRINGS V. 1993. The failure of agricultural 
collectivization in the People’s Republic of Kam-
puchea (1979-1989) Working paper 80. Clay-
ton: Centre of Southeast Asian Stuies. Monash 
University. 
● FRINGS V. 1997. Le paysan cambodgien et 
le socialisme : la politique agricole de la Répu-
blique populaire du Kampuchéa et de l’Etat du 
Cambodge. Paris: L’Harmattan. 
● GHAI Y. 2007. Economic land concessions in 
Cambodia: A human rights perspective. Phnom 
Penh: United Nations, High Commissioner for 
Human Rights. 
● GLOBAL WITNESS. 2007. Cambodia’s family 
trees illegal logging and the stripping of public 
assets by Cambodia’s elite. Washington: Global 
Witness. 
● GLOBAL WITNESS. 2013. Rubber barons, 
how Vietnamese companies and international 
fi nanciers are driving a land grabbing crisis in 
Cambodia and Laos. London: Global Witness.
● GLOBAL WITNESS. 2015. The costs of luxury: 
Cambodia’s illegal trade in precious wood with 
China. London: Global Witness.
● GOUVERNEMENT GENERAL D’INDOCHINE. 
1910. Arrêté portant sur la création de six ré-
serves forestières au Cambodge. Hanoi: Archives 
d’Outre-Mer.
● GREVE H.S. 1993. Land tenure and property 
rights in Cambodia. Phnom Penh. 
● GRIMSDITCH M. and N. HENDERSON. 2009. 
Untitled tenure insecurity and inequality in the 
Cambodian land sector. Phnom Penh: Bridges 
Across Borders Southeast Asia, Centre on Hous-
ing Rights and Evictions, Jesuit Refugee Service.
● GUILLOU A. 2006. “The question of land in 
Cambodia: Perceptions, access, and use since 
decollectivization”. In Agriculture in Southeast 
Asia: An update, ed. DUFUMIER M., 299-324. 
Paris-Aix: EDISUD.
● HARDIN G. 1968. “The tragedy of the com-
mons”. Sciences 162: 1243-1248.
● HIBOU B. 2004. “Cambodge : quel modèle 
concessionaire ?” In Le royaume concession-
naire. Libéralisation économique et violence 
politique au Cambodge, ed. BAYART J.-F., 77. 
Paris: Fonds d’Analyse des Sociétés Politiques 
(FASOPO).
● HIRSCH P. 2011. Titling against grabbing? 
Critiques and conundrums around land for-
malisation in Southeast Asia. Paper presentat 
at the International Conference “Global Land 
Grabbing”, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK.
● HOBLEY M. 2007. Does forestry have a role 
in poverty reduction? Issues and concepts. Pa-
per present at the conference “Poverty Reduc-
tion and Forests: Tenure, Market and Policy Re-
forms”, Bangkok: RECOFTC.
● HOU Y. 1955. La paysannerie du Cambodge 
et ses projets de modernisation. PhD, La Sor-
bonne.
● HU N. 1965. Les services publics éonomiques 
du Cambodge. PhD, Université de Phnom Penh.
● INDEPENDENT FOREST SECTOR REVIEW. 
2004. The forest sector in Cambodia. Policy 
choices, issues and options, 119. Phnom Penh.
● JALILIAN J. 2008. “Cambodia: A 2008 macro 
view - key indicators, major development chal-
lenges, our region, the private sector”. Cambo-
dia Development Review 12, no 2: 4.
● JENNAR R. 1995. The Cambodian constitu-
tions (1953-1993). Bangkok: White Lotus. 
● KHIEU S. 1959. L’économie et le développe-
ment industriel du Cambodge. PhD, La Sor-
bonne.
● KIERNAN B. 1982. “The Samlaut rebellion, 
1967-1968”. In Peasants and politics in Kam-
puchea, 1942-1981, eds. KIERNAN B. and C. 
BOUA, 166-193. London: Zed Press.
● KIERNAN B. 2004. How pol pot came to pow-
er. Colonialism, nationalism, and communism in 
Cambodia 1930-1975. New Haven & London: 
Yale University Press. 
THE FRAGMENTATION OF LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN CAMBODIA:
PEASANTS AND THE FORMALIZATION OF LAND RIGHTS
34
● KIERNAN B. and C. BOUA eds. 1982. Peasants 
and politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981. London: 
Zed Press.
● LE BILLON P. 2002. “Logging in muddy wa-
ters: The politics of forest exploitation in Cam-
bodia”. Critical Asian Studies 34, no 4: 563-586.
● LEDGERWOOD J. and J. VIJGHEN. 2002. “De-
cisions-making in khmer villages”. In Cambodia 
emerges from the past: Eight essays, ed. LEDG-
ERWOOD J., 109-150. Northern Illinois: Center 
of Southeast Asian Studies.
● LEUPRECHT P. 2004. Land concessions for 
economic purposes in Cambodia: A human 
rights perspective. Phnom Penh: United Nations, 
High Commissioner for Human Right. 
● LI T.M. 2002. “Engaging simpliﬁ cations: Com-
munity-based natural resources management, 
market processes and state agendas in upland 
Southeast Asia”. World Development 30, no 2: 
265-283.
● LUNDSTRÖM S. and P. RONNAS. 2006. Em-
ployment and growth in Cambodia - an inte-
grated economic analysis Country economic 
report. Stockholm: Swedish International De-
velopment Cooperation. 
● MALTONI B. 2006. The invisible fl ow. Rural to 
rural migration in Cambodia. A case study in the 
provinces of Takeo and Prey Veng, 60. Phnom 
Penh: AVSF-CICDA.
● MARCHAL R. 2004. “Cambodge, de la guerre 
à la paix, ou d’un régime militaire à un régime 
policier”. In Le royaume concessionaire. Libé-
ralisation économique et violence politique 
au Cambodge, ed. BAYART J.-F. Paris: Fonds 
d’Analyse des Sociétés Politiques (FASOPO).
● MCKENNEY B. and T. PROM. 2002. Natural 
resources and rural livelihoods in Cambodia: A 
baseline assessment, Working paper 23. Phnom 
Penh: Cambodia Development Resource Institute. 
● MERTZ O., C. PADOCH, J.M. FOX, R.A. 
CRAMB, S.J. LEISZ, T.L. NGUYEN and D.V. TRAN. 
2009. “Swidden change in Southeast Asia: Un-
derstanding causes and consequences”. Human 
Ecology 37: 259-264.
● MILNE S. 2013. “Under the leopard’s skin: 
Land commodiﬁ cation and the dilemmas of in-
digenous communal title in upland Cambodia”. 
Asia Pacifi c Viewpoint 5: 323-339.
● MINISTRY OF PLANNING. 2012. Migration 
in Cambodia: Report of the Cambodian rural 
urban migration project. Phnom Penh: Ministry 
of Planning. 
● MLMUPC. 2014. Preliminary data on the re-
sults of the directive 01 land titling campaign. 
Phnom Penh: Ministry of Land Management, 
Urban Planning and Construction.
● MOM K. 2009. “Fisheries sector policy, le-
gal and institutional framework in Cambodia: 
Is there a place for srengthening decentraliza-
tion?” In Emerging trends, challenges and in-
novations. Community based natural resource 
management (CBRNM) in Cambodia. Learning 
symposiums and the development of selected 
papers, ed. The Learning Institute. Phnom Penh: 
CBNRM Learning Institute.
● MÜLLER F.-V. 2012. Commune-based land 
allocation for poverty reduction in Cambodia. 
Achievements and lessons learned from the 
project land allocation for social and economic 
development (LASED). Paper presentat at the 
Annual World Bank Conference “Land and Pov-
erty”, Washington DC.
● MÜLLER F.-V. and G. ZÜLSDORF. 2013. Old poli-
cies – new action: A surprising political initiative 
to recognize human rights in the Cambodian land 
reform. Paper presentat at the Annual World Bank 
Conference “Land and Poverty”, Washington DC.
● NARIM K. and L. CROTHERS. 2014. “Calls for 
speedier indigenous communal titles”. Cambo-
dia Daily, 30 April.
● NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS. 2009. 
Demographic census 2008 (fi nal results). Phnom 
Penh: Ministry of Planning - Royal Government 
of Cambodia.
● NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS. 2012. 
Reclassification of urban areas in Cambodia, 
2011. Phnom Penh: National Institute of Statisc-
tics and UNFPA. 
● NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS. 2014. 
Census of agriculture in Cambodia 2013: Pre-
liminary report national. Phnom Penh: Ministry 
of Planning & Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries.
THE FRAGMENTATION OF LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN CAMBODIA:
PEASANTS AND THE FORMALIZATION OF LAND RIGHTS
35
● OLIVIER M. 1954. Le régime domanial et fon-
cier. Phnom Penh: Missions Francaises auprès 
des Juridictions Judiciaires Khmères. 
● PELLINI A. 2007. Decentralisation policy in 
Cambodia. PhD, University of Tampere.
● PHANN D., S. PHAY K. TONG and D. PON. 
2015. Landlessness and child labour in Cam-
bodia. Phnom Penh: Cambodia Development 
Resource Institute.
● PILGRIM J., C. NGIN and J.-C. DIEPART. 2012. 
“Multiple migrations, displacements and land 
transfers at ta kream in northwest Cambodia”. 
In Migration, rural livelihoods and natural re-
source management, eds HECHT S.B., KANDEL 
S. and MORALES A., 33-56. El Salvador: Inter-
national Development Research Centre (IDRC) of 
Canada - Ford Foundation - Fundación PRISMA.
● PILLOT D. 2007. Jardins et rizières du Cam-
bodge, les enjeux du développement agricole. 
Paris: GRET-Karthala. 
● POLANYI K. 1957. The great transformation. 
The political and economic origins of our time. 
Boston: Beacon Press. 
● PRUD’HOMME R. 1969. L’économie du Cam-
bodge. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
● PYE D. 2013. “Land-titling process ’urgent’”, 
Oxfam says Phnom Penh Post, 18 October.
● PYE D. and T. MAY. 2014. “The calculus of 
logging“. Phnom Penh Post, Fri, 10 October.
● ROBERTS A.S. 2011. Phytosociology, history 
and diversity farmer-managed landscape on the 
Tonle Sap fl ood plain. PhD, City University.
● ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA. 2001. 
Land law Ns/rkm/0801/14. Phnom Penh. 
● Royal Government of Cambodia. 2002. Law 
of forestry Ns/rkm/0802/016. 
● ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA. 2003. 
Sub-decree on community forestry manage-
ment. In 79 ANK/BK.
● ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA. 
2005a. National strategic development plan 
2006-2010. Phnom Penh. 
● ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA. 
2005b. Sub-decree on economic land conces-
sions (146 ank/bk). Phnom Penh.
● ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA. 
2006a. Ed. Ministry of Agriculture - Forestry - 
Fisheries. Agricultural sector strategic develop-
ment plan. Phnom Penh. 
● ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA. 
2006b. Law of fi sheries Ns/rkm/0406/011. 
● ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA. 2007. 
Circular 02 on measures against illegal holding 
of state land. Vol. 02.SR  of. 
● ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA. 2009. 
Sub-decree on the procedures of registration of 
land of indigenous communities 83 ank.Bk. 
● RUNGSWASDISAB P. 1995. War and trade: 
Siamese interventions in Cambodia 1767-1851. 
PhD, University of Wollongong.
● SAVE CAMBODIA’S WILDLIFE. 2006. The atlas 
of Cambodia. National poverty and environment 
maps. Phnom Penh: Save Cambodia’s Wildlife. 
● SAVE CAMBODIA’S WILDLIFE. 2014. Atlas of 
Cambodia: Maps on socio-economic develop-
ment and environment. 2nd edition ed. Phnom 
Penh, Cambodia: Save Cambodia’s Wildlife. 
● SLOCOMB M. 2007. Colons and coolies: The 
development of Cambodia’s rubber plantations. 
Bangkok: White Lotus Press. 
● SO S. 2009. Political economy of land reg-
istration in Cambodia. PhD, Northern Illinois 
University.
● SOK S. 2014. “Limited state and strong social 
forces: Fishing lot management in Cambodia”. 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 45, no 02: 
174-193.
● SPERFELDT C., F. TEK and B. CHIA-LUNG TAI. 
2012. An examination of policies promoting 
large-scale investments in farmland in Cambo-
dia. Phnom Penh: Cambodian Human Rights 
Action Committee (CHRAC).
● SUBEDI S.P. 2012. A human rights analysis of 
economic and other land concessions in Cam-
bodia. Addendum to the report of the special 
rapporteur on the situation of human rights in 
Cambodia: Human Rights Council.
● TAYLOR J. 2011. Food security, climate change 
and natural resources management in Cambodia. 
A overview of the litterature and source book. 
Phnom Penh: Learning Institute and IDRC.
36
THE FRAGMENTATION OF LAND TENURE SYSTEMS IN CAMBODIA:
PEASANTS AND THE FORMALIZATION OF LAND RIGHTS
● THIEL F. 2010. “Donor-driven land reform in 
Cambodia - property rights, planning, and land 
value taxation”. Erkunde 64, no 3.
● THION S. 1993. Watching Cambodia. Ten 
paths to entering the Cambodian tangle. Bang-
kok: White Lotus. 
● THOMAS F. 1999. Histoire du régime et des 
services forestiers français en Indochine de 1862 
à 1945. Hanoi: Editions THÊ GIÓI. 
● TY S. CF agreement signing. http://recoftc.
org/site/index.php?id=705
● UN K. and S. SO. 2009. “Politics of natural 
resource use in Cambodia”. Asian Affairs: An 
American Review 36, no 3: 123-138.
● VAN ACKER F. 1999. Hitting a stone with an 
egg? Cambodia’s rural economy and land ten-
ure in transition Cas discussion paper. Antwer-
pen: Centre for ASEAN studies and Centre for 
International Management and Development. 
● VIZE J. and M. HORNUNG. 2013. Indigenous 
peoples and land titling in Cambodia: A study of 
six villages. Paper present at the Annual World 
Bank Conference “Land and Poverty”, Wash-
ington DC.




● WORLD BANK. 2006. Cambodia. Halving pov-
erty by 2015? Poverty assessment 2006. World 
Bank, East Asia and the Paciﬁ c Region.
● WORLD BANK. 2007a. Cambodia rural sector 
note and business plan. World Bank: East-Asia 
and Pacifi c Region, Sustainable Development 
Department.
● WORLD BANK. 2007b. World development 
report 2008: Agriculture for development. 
Washinton: The International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development / The World Bank.
● WORLD BANK. 2009. Cambodia land man-
agement and administration project enhanced 
review report. Washinton: World Bank.
● WORLD BANK. 2013. Where have all the poor 
gone? Cambodia poverty assessment 2013. 
Washington, DC: Work Bank. 
● ZSOMBOR P. and P. AUN. 2012. “32 land con-
cessions approved since moratorium”. Cambo-
dia Daily, 18 November.
● ZSOMBOR P. and B. PHORN. 2010. “A year 
later, World Bank project seen as ‘mistake’”. 
Cambodia Daily, 18 September.
